ORIGINS OF THE TARGETED PROGRAM

The phrase "neocons wanted another 'Pearl Harbor'" typically refers to a specific passage in a 2000 report by the Project for the New American Century (PNAC), a neoconservative think tank. In Rebuilding America's Defenses, the authors argued that transforming the U.S. military into a force capable of sustaining global preeminence—"revolutionary change" in strategy, spending, force structure, and forward basing—would be a slow process without a major shock to public and political will. They wrote: "Further, the process of transformation, even if it brings revolutionary change, is likely to be a long one, absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event—like a new Pearl Harbor."

Context of the Report

PNAC, founded in 1997 by William Kristol and Robert Kagan, advocated a "Reaganite" foreign policy of military strength, moral clarity, and American global leadership (often termed "benevolent global hegemony"). Key figures associated with PNAC or its ideas—including Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, and others—later served in senior roles in the George W. Bush administration. The report called for increased defense spending (to 3.5–3.8% of GDP), modernization of forces, a larger military, new bases, missile defenses, and the ability to fight multiple theater wars. It built on earlier ideas, such as the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance draft associated with Wolfowitz and Cheney.

The "new Pearl Harbor" line was an observation about political reality: major shifts in military posture historically require public mobilization after a dramatic event (analogous to how the 1941 Japanese attack ended U.S. isolationism). It was not a literal call to orchestrate an attack, nor did it specify terrorism, the Middle East, or any particular enemy. The document focused more on state competitors (e.g., China) and conventional military transformation than on non-state actors like al-Qaeda.

Post-9/11 Developments

The September 11, 2001, attacks (killing nearly 3,000 people) provided exactly that kind of catalyzing event. Within hours and days, Bush administration officials—including those with PNAC ties—began discussing responses that extended beyond al-Qaeda in Afghanistan to broader goals, including regime change in Iraq. PNAC itself sent a letter to President Bush shortly after 9/11 urging a "determined effort to remove Saddam Hussein from power," even without direct evidence linking Iraq to the attacks. The subsequent "Global War on Terror," invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, PATRIOT Act expansions, and shifts in defense priorities aligned with many PNAC recommendations: higher military budgets, forward presence, and assertive use of U.S. power.

Critics (from the left, paleoconservatives, libertarians, and 9/11 "truth" movements) interpret this as evidence that neoconservatives cynically welcomed or even anticipated 9/11 to advance a pre-existing imperial agenda—regime change across the Middle East, increased spending, and reduced domestic constraints on executive power. Some tie it to related ideas, like Michael Ledeen's earlier comments about "getting lucky" with external shocks that awaken a nation (referencing Pearl Harbor as historically galvanizing). Others link it to "Clean Break" strategy papers from the 1990s focused on Israel and regional threats.

Counterpoints and Historical Reality

• The statement was public and predictive, not conspiratorial: Think tanks routinely analyze how policy windows open after crises (e.g., the Great Depression and New Deal, or Pearl Harbor itself). Similar observations appear across ideologies. The report did not call for manufacturing an attack; it noted the difficulty of peacetime transformation.

• 9/11 was executed by al-Qaeda: The attacks were planned and carried out by Osama bin Laden's network, with extensive intelligence trails (including prior warnings ignored due to bureaucratic failures, risk aversion, and misplaced priorities). The 9/11 Commission documented intelligence shortcomings but found no evidence of U.S. government orchestration or deliberate stand-down. Claims of "inside job" involvement by neocons, Israel, or others rely on anomalies, omissions, and motive-based speculation rather than forensic proof—and have been widely debunked by structural engineers, aviation experts, and investigators. These theories often veer into antisemitic territory by fixating on Jewish neoconservatives or "Zionist" cabals.

• Policy continuity and opportunism: Neoconservatives (and many others) had long advocated confronting Saddam Hussein, containing Iran/Syria, and promoting democracy by force where feasible. 9/11 created political cover to pursue elements of that vision, including the Iraq War (justified partly on WMD intelligence that proved flawed or exaggerated). This reflects how crises are exploited by policymakers across the spectrum—not unique evidence of a plot. The Iraq War's costs (trillions of dollars, thousands of U.S. deaths, regional instability, rise of ISIS) later discredited much of the neoconservative project in the eyes of the public and many conservatives.

• Pearl Harbor analogy has limits: The original 1941 attack was by a state actor (Japan) amid rising tensions; 9/11 was asymmetric terrorism. U.S. entry into WWII was defensive after direct assault. Post-9/11 wars mixed legitimate self-defense with elective nation-building.

In short, the PNAC document reveals a hawkish faction's frustration with post-Cold War drift and their belief that only a major threat would rally support for sustained primacy. They got their event on 9/11 and moved aggressively to implement aspects of their agenda. Whether this was shrewd opportunism, ideological overreach, or something more sinister is debated endlessly. What is clear is that the resulting policies—endless wars, eroded civil liberties, massive debt, and strategic distractions—had profound, often negative consequences for U.S. power and security. Hindsight shows the limits of using terrorism as a blank check for grand strategy. Skepticism of elite motives is healthy; assuming a false-flag conspiracy requires extraordinary evidence that has never materialized.